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Controversy often follows when patents are obtained in a pioneering area of 
technology. Patent filing activity in the field of regenerative medicine and in relation 
to stem cells in particular has not escaped opprobrium, although it is instructive to 
compare the nature of the debates that are taking place over the patenting of stem cells 
in the US and Europe. In the US, debate over the early patent applications made by 
the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) has been intense2, but at least it 
appears to have been grounded firmly in patent law principles. In Europe, the debate 
has skewed away from the basic patent law tenets of novelty, inventiveness and 
industrial utility and has entered something of a twilight zone, with the European 
Patent Office (EPO) serving as a diffident forum for difficult moral and ethical 
arguments about the destruction of human embryos and the commercial exploitation 
of human life. 
 
The US Position - WARF 
 
The breadth of the claims relating to human stem cells in the early WARF patent 
filings has to date been the major focus of debate in the US. The WARF patent 
applications were filed after work carried out by James Thomson and co-workers at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the 1990s. Thomson’s team was the first to 
isolate human embryonic stem cells, as described in a publication in 1998 in Science3. 
The first WARF patent granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in 
this area was US Patent No. 5843780, entitled “Primate Embryonic Stem Cells”. It 
claimed (inter alia) “A purified preparation of primate embryonic stem cells” with 
certain characteristics. Further WARF patents granted by the USPTO were US Patent 
Nos. 6200806 and 7029913. The broad nature of the monopolies obtained by WARF 
has been described as embodying “one of the strongest possible property claims in the 
field of stem cells, establishing control at the very root of all possible lineages of 
cellular differentiation”4. 
 
However, the validity of these three WARF patents was challenged in reexamination 
proceedings brought by the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, 
essentially on the ground that what was claimed was non-inventive and therefore 
unpatentable. In brief, the argument was that the techniques described in the WARF 
patents had previously been used to isolate embryonic stem cells in other mammals. 
As such, their application to human embryonic stem cells was rendered obvious. The 
USPTO accepted this argument in a decision that was issued in March 20075. 
 
The European Position 
 
Too Broad Patents? 
The issue of breadth of claims was addressed in a report produced by the European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technology (EGE) in 20026. The EGE arrived 
2            Genomics, Society and Policy 
  2008  2008, Vol.4, No.3, pp.1-9 
_____________  2 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.4, No.3 (2008) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network. 
at the conclusion that isolated, unmodified stem cells do not fulfil the legal 
requirements for patentability, particularly due to their lack of industrial application, 
because unmodified stem cells do not have one specific use but a very large range of 
potential undetermined uses: “Therefore, to patent such unmodified stem cell lines 
would…lead to too broad patents”. 
 
Underlying the EGE’s statement about the undesirability of patents with broad scope 
was concern that they might stifle research and thereby restrict the benefits of any 
medical advances from being passed on to patients. The EGE emphasised in its report 
that patents are supposed to benefit society overall and this factor should be borne in 
mind when assessing the availability of patents. The EGE’s position has come in for 
criticism7, not least because it lacks a substantive basis in European patent law. 
 
One of the legal requirements for patentability is that the breadth of granted patent 
claims should be commensurate with the inventor’s contribution to technical 
development in a particular field8. In essence, broad patent claims should only be 
granted when an invention is deserving of them, such as, for example, a pioneering 
invention in a new area of technology. Concern about “too broad patents” is therefore 
not unique to stem cell technology. 
 
Even though the remarks in the EGE’s report may not have had a solid grounding in 
European patent law, it has recently been observed that the concern about awarding 
broad monopolies over stem cell technology without any specific proof of utility may 
have been quite apposite. This is because stem cells derived from embryos do not yet 
have an established, specific use: “their potential utility for repair of failing organs or 
tissues is dependent on the subsequent development of ways of coaxing the cells to 
differentiate” in a particular way9. 
 
Yet neither lack of utility nor lack of inventive step was the basis for the rejection by 
the European Patent Office of another early WARF patent, European patent 
application 96903521.1, in July 2004. Instead, the EPO Examining Division adopted a 
distinctly European position in relation to the WARF patent claims, based upon an 
expansive interpretation of the so-called “morality provisions” in the European 
Biotechnology Patent Directive10, the genesis of which will now be examined. 
 
The European Biotechnology Patent Directive 
The Biotechnology Patent Directive was first proposed by the European Commission 
in 1988. It was intended to be a harmonising measure, its purpose being to eliminate 
disparities between the Member States in the legal protection afforded to 
biotechnological inventions. After protracted debate and in the face of intense 
political opposition from animal welfare activists and environmentalists, in 1995 - at a 
time when public concern about developments in biotechnology in general was at its 
height - the first version of the Directive was vetoed by the European Parliament. In 
introducing a second draft of the Directive, the European Commission was suitably 
contrite and attempted to seek consensus by building in new provisions that were said 
to give due emphasis to the ethical aspects of patenting life forms. 
 
The Biotechnology Patent Directive states in Article 5(1) that the human body, at the 
various stages of its formation and development, cannot be patented. The same 
directive also states that elements isolated from the human body or otherwise 
3            Genomics, Society and Policy 
  2008  2008, Vol.4, No.3, pp.1-9 
_____________  3 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.4, No.3 (2008) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network. 
produced by means of a technical process (including, for example, a human gene) are 
not excluded from patentability, even when the structure of an element is identical to 
that of its natural counterpart, provided that the rights conferred by the patent in 
question do not extend to the human body in its natural state11. 
 
Article 6 is the “failsafe” clause that is intended to prohibit the grant of patents the 
exploitation of which would offend against the morality of ordinary European 
citizens. It states as follows: 
 
(1) Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to ordre publique or morality; however, 
exploitation shall not be deemed to be so merely because it is prohibited by law or 
regulation. 
 
(2) On the basis of [the above] paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be 
considered unpatentable: 
 
(a) processes for cloning human beings; 
 
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
 
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; 
 
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to 
cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, 
and also animals resulting from such processes.  
 
The prohibition enshrined in Article 6(1) is derived from a long-standing tradition in 
European patent law, with origins dating back to early twentieth century international 
convention and beyond12, that is aimed at preventing the grant of patent monopolies 
for inventions that would be morally repugnant to the public, if exploited by the 
patentee. However, the exclusions in Article 6(2) have no deep-seated tradition in 
European patent law and arguably reflect instead a list of “hot” political issues that 
preoccupied MEPs by virtue of being prevalent in the popular news press in the 
1990s, rather than a considered attempt to legislate for the future of the European 
patent system. 
 
Article 6(2)(a) was intended to prohibit patents claiming techniques for the cloning of 
human beings, cloning being an aspect of biotechnology that has often excited the 
newspapers. It will be recalled that the Roslin Institute and Dolly the sheep had 
attracted a good deal of media coverage during 1997, as the second draft of the 
Directive was being considered. Article 6(2)(b) was intended to indicate a clear stance 
“on principle” against germ line gene therapy13. Article 6(2)(c) was probably another 
legacy of the emergence of nuclear transfer technology14. Article 6(2)(d) may have 
been the product of agitation by animal welfare activists, but in fact, the test laid 
down in this provision is arguably easier to apply than the previous test for the 
balancing of animal welfare against the perceived usefulness of an invention to man, 
as laid down in the EPO’s caselaw in the Oncomouse case15. 
 
Although the intention behind the list in Article 6(2) was ostensibly to provide clarity 
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to the scope of the general exclusion in Article 6(1), concerns were expressed at an 
early stage in the life of the Biotechnology Patent Directive that the reality might be 
somewhat different16. 
 
Interpreting Article 6 
The Biotechnology Patent Directive is a piece of European Union legislation and so 
the ultimate authority for interpretation of its provisions is the European Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg. The Court of Justice has already held that Article 6(1) gives 
the administrative patent-granting authorities (ie, the national patent offices) within 
the European Union a wide scope for manoeuvre in applying the exclusion17. In 
theory, this should allow the national patent offices to take account of particular social 
and cultural concerns that the exploitation of certain types of technology might give 
rise to in their respective countries. For example, in the UK, where the climate for 
stem cell research is positive and the production of new human embryonic stem cell 
lines is legal, the UK Intellectual Property Office has taken the proactive step of 
publishing guidance on how it will treat UK patent applications for inventions 
involving human embryonic stem cells18. 
 
Although the Article 6 provisions of the Biotechnology Patent Directive were 
incorporated into the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) in 1999, with the intention of aligning the EPC with the Directive, it should be 
noted that the EPO is an autonomous institution. It is not a body whose decisions are 
subject to judicial review by the European Community courts. This has not presented 
a problem in the interpretation of Article 6(1), which, as indicated above, was based 
on an existing provision of the European Patent Convention with a solid legal 
foundation19 that had already been subject to interpretation in the EPO’s caselaw20. It 
is the lack of a jurisprudential track record in the interpretation of the provisions of 
Article 6(2) that has given rise to recent problems in Europe, with the EPO having 
become (almost by default) the final arbiter of what these provisions mean, even 
though they were the product of the convoluted and highly politicised legislative 
passage of the Biotechnology Patent Directive through the European Union’s law-
making institutions. 
 
Since most patents for biotechnological inventions are filed at the EPO in Munich (for 
reasons both of cost and convenience), the consequence of a broad interpretation by 
the EPO of the exclusions in Article 6(2) would be to take away the room for 
manoeuvre that was intended to be given to the national patent offices in the Member 
States by means of Article 6(1). As we shall see, the Enlarged Board of Appeal has 
recently held that a broad interpretation of Article 6(2)(c) is indeed appropriate, but 
before turning to the cases, it is necessary to explain briefly some of the scientific 
terminology. 
 
Mammalian stem cells can be classified in two main ways: by the source from which 
they are isolated and by the extent to which they can form different cell types 
(differentiation). Adult stem cells are found in adult tissues, such as bone marrow. 
Embryonic stem cells are found in the blastocyst, the ball of cells that constitutes an 
embryo. Totipotent stem cells can be differentiated into any cell type in the body. 
Human totipotent stem cells can be isolated from a human embryo at between four to 
six days after fertilization, during the first divisions of a fertilized egg. Historically, 
this isolation process was destructive, although non-destructive techniques for the 
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generation of human embryonic stem cell lines have been proposed21. Pluripotent 
cells can be differentiated into any cell type within the body, but they are incapable of 
forming a viable embryo. Multipotent cells are capable of differentiating into a 
limited number of different cell types. 
 
The Edinburgh Patent 
The first major occasion on which the EPO had to consider the wording of the Article 
6(2)(c) exclusion was the famous Edinburgh patent case. European patent no. 
0695351 (“the Edinburgh patent”) is entitled “Isolation, selection and propagation of 
animal transgenic stem cells”. The Edinburgh patent originally described a method of 
using genetic engineering to isolate stem cells, including embryonic stem cells, from 
differentiated cells in culture in order to obtain pure stem cell cultures. The Edinburgh 
patent was initially granted with claims that covered human embryonic stem cells, 
whereupon it was opposed by fourteen parties, including Greenpeace and the 
governments of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. In the course of the opposition 
proceedings, the EPO’s Opposition Division was called upon to interpret various 
provisions of the European Biotechnology Patent Directive. 
 
In particular, the Opposition Division considered that a broad interpretation of Article 
6(2)(c) was appropriate, the reason being that a narrow interpretation of Article 
6(2)(c) would render it redundant over Article 5(1). With a broad interpretation, the 
exclusion from patentability in Article 6(2)(c) was a prohibition that not only 
prevented the granting of patents covering the use of human embryos, but also patents 
covering any products derived from the use of human embryos. 
 
In summary, the Opposition Division maintained that if the use of a human embryo is 
ethically unacceptable – as specified in Article 6(2)(c) – then any potentially inventive 
method or process that involves the prior use of a human embryo must also be 
ethically unacceptable. As a result, the owner of the Edinburgh patent decided to limit 
the patent claims to a method for genetically modifying stem cells (such as human 
adult stem cells). The EPO agreed that the patent could be maintained in that form. 
The proprietor initially decided to appeal this decision, but the appeal was withdrawn 
at a hearing before the EPO Board of Appeal in November 200722. As a result, the 
moral and ethical issues wrapped up in any detailed consideration of the validity and 
legal scope of Article 6(2)(c) were effectively parked for another day. 
 
The WARF Patent in Europe  
The invention described in European patent application 96903521.1 was directed to 
cell cultures comprising primate embryonic stem cells. The inventor claimed that 
these cultures had been obtained for the first time in a way that allowed the cells to be 
cultured continuously for long periods whilst maintaining their ability to differentiate. 
The patent application stated that pluripotent stem cells that were obtained using the 
invention could be useful, both as models for human genetic diseases and in tissue 
transplantation for a wide variety of conditions. 
 
The EPO’s Examining Division acknowledged that the patent application met all of 
the substantive requirements for patentability: novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability. It refused the application on the grounds that the prohibition in Article 
6(2)(c) excludes from patentability not only uses of human embryos, but also any 
product which originates from human embryos, where the isolation of that product 
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requires the direct and unavoidable use of a human embryo. In its written decision, it 
stated as follows: 
 
“The Examining Division takes the view that the application 
discloses and claims cultures of primate, including human, 
embryonic stem cells which cultures necessitate the use of an 
embryo and specific culture conditions for their generation and thus, 
said cultures integrate the industrial use of human embryos. Thus, 
the subject-matter....is not patentable under [Article 6(2)(c)] and the 
application is refused”23. 
 
WARF appealed the Examining Division’s decision, citing “countless problems” with 
the broad construction of the exclusion in Article 6(2)(c), including the argument that 
such an interpretation runs contrary to established EPO caselaw under the general 
morality exclusion in the European Patent Convention24 and that it requires the EPO 
to act as a moral censor. On the other hand, Article 6(2)(c) must exclude something 
from patentability. It has been noted that a narrow construction of Artcle 6(2)(c) that 
is limited to a prohibition on repetitive uses of an embryo as an instrument in an 
industrial process lacks conviction, because it does not correspond to anything within 
the contemplation of those responsible for the drafting of the Biotechnology Patent 
Directive or indeed anything within current knowledge and experience25. 
 
The appeal thus raised a number of questions relating to the correct legal 
interpretation of the exclusion in Article 6(2)(c) of the European Biotechnology 
Patent Directive26. Following submissions made by various parties (including the 
President of the EPO) and a hearing in June 2008, a ruling by the EPO’s Enlarged 
Board of Appeal was made on 25 November 200827. 
 
“No Room For Manoeuvre” 
The Enlarged Board proceeded on the basis that it should examine the ordinary 
meaning of the exclusion, in the light of its objective and purpose. It therefore 
analysed the early drafts of the Biotechnology Patent Directive and its chequered 
legislative history. It derived from these documents concern that the Biotechnology 
Patent Directive might encourage human embryos to be commodified and it noted 
opposition by European Parliamentarians to practices involving the “misuse” of 
human embryos. These concepts are somewhat vague, but the Enlarged Board 
considered them to be consistent with one of the main objectives of the Directive that 
was ultimately codified in the final text, which is the protection of human dignity, in 
the patenting context28. 
 
The Enlarged Board considered that the prima facie meaning of the exclusion was 
clear: it prohibited patenting, if a human embryo must be used for industrial or 
commercial purposes: 
 
“making the [claimed product in the WARF patent] involves the 
destruction of human embryos. This use involving destruction is an 
integral and essential part of the industrial or commercial 
exploitation of the claimed invention, and thus violates the 
prohibition [in Article 6(2)(c)]” 
 
It concluded that the exclusion forbids the patenting of claims to products that can 
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only be made by a method which involves the destruction of human embryos. There 
was “no room for manoeuvre”. It did not matter that the use of a human embryo was 
not actually claimed, nor was it of relevance that technical developments subsequent 
to the date of filing of the patent application meant that the destruction of human 
embryos was now unnecessary29, in order to make products falling within the claims. 
 
The patentee sought a reference to the European Court of Justice for clarification of 
the meaning of Article 6(2)(c), but this was refused by the Enlarged Board, essentially 





The patentability of stem cell technology - specifically, technology relating to human 
embryonic stem cells - varies between the US and Europe because of a uniquely 
European legal provision concerning the moral and ethical status of inventions. Even 
though the Enlarged Board was at pains to point out that the WARF decision was not 
concerned in general with inventions relating to human stem cells or human stem cell 
cultures, the high-profile nature of a case such as this (and the previous Edinburgh 
patent decision) inevitably influences opinion. As a result, companies may come to 
see the US as a safer place to exploit stem cell technology30, thus potentially altering 
the competitive landscape in America’s favour. 
 
Although there are divergent views across the European Union on stem cell research 
and human embryonic stem cell studies in particular, the various governments of the 
Member States cannot have intended with the Biotechnology Patent Directive to 
surrender the policy decision about whether to grant patents in an important field of 
new technology to the EPO. Yet because the EPO is the de facto venue of choice for 
companies seeking patent protection in Europe and its decisions cannot be reviewed 
by the European courts, it effectively has the last word on whether to turn down a 
patent on moral or ethical grounds, with effect throughout the whole of the European 
Union and beyond31. The European Court of Justice will only now get its say if there 
is a reference to it from a national court, by means of an appeal from a decision of a 
national patent office on a locally applied-for patent application in a Member State. 
 
Patentees have already engaged in imaginative drafting strategies in order to 
circumvent anticipated difficulties in patent prosecution at the EPO32, but it seems 
likely that the European prohibition will inevitably impose some measure of 
competitive disadvantage upon all companies and institutions active in this sector of 
the life sciences33. 
 
In conclusion, whilst in the US the patent system presents a reasonably level playing 
field, irrespective of the field of technology, with well understood criteria for the 
grant of monopoly rights of exploitation, those seeking patent protection in Europe in 
the area of stem cell technology (and particularly human stem cell cultures) are 
having to grapple with an additional legal hurdle based on the elusive notion of a 
European standard of “moral acceptability”. In addition, the system is being 
administered by a centralised patent granting office - the EPO - that is arguably ill 
suited to the task of assessing inventions according to such an imprecise legal 
standard and moreover has no defined role in the formulation of EU industrial policy 
8            Genomics, Society and Policy 
  2008  2008, Vol.4, No.3, pp.1-9 
_____________  8 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.4, No.3 (2008) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network. 
towards stem cell research. 
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